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Non-Classical Expected Utility Theory∗
V. I. Danilov† and A. Lambert-Mogiliansky‡
Abstract
In this paper we extend Savage’s theory of decision-making under
uncertainty from a classical environment into a non-classical one. We
formulate the corresponding axioms and provide representation theo-
rems for qualitative measures and expected utility.
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose an extension of the standard approach to decision-
making under uncertainty in Savage’s style from the classical model into the
more general model of non-classical measurement theory corresponding the
basic mathematical structure of Quantum Mechanics (see [4]). .
Formally, this means that we substitute the Boolean algebra model with
a more general ortholattice structure (see [4]). In order to provide a first line
of motivation for our approach we turn back to Savage’s theory in a very
simplified version. In Savage [11], the issue is about the valuation of “acts”
with uncertain consequences or results. One of our simplifications is to assume
that we are able to provide a cardinal measure of the results - in utils (we below
clarify this somehow imprecise formulation). Acts lead to results (measurable
in utils), but the results are uncertain. How can one formalize acts with
uncertain outcomes?
The classical approach amounts to the following. There exists a set X
of states of nature, which may in principle occur. An act corresponds to a
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function f : X → R. If the state s ∈ X is realized, our agent receives a utility
of f(s) utils. But before hand it is not possible to say which state s is going
to be realized. To put it differently, the agent has to choose among acts before
he learns about the state s. This is the heart of the problem.
Among possible acts there are “constant” acts, i.e., acts with a result that
is known before hand, independently of the state of nature s. The constant
act is described by a (real) number c ∈ R. It is therefore natural to link an
arbitrary act f with its “utility equivalent” CE(f) ∈ R. This corresponds
to defining the constant act c (with utility outcome CE(f)) such that our
decision-maker is indifferent between the act f and the constant act (with
utility value) CE(f). The first postulate of this simplified (we assume also
that the set X is finite) Savage model asserts the existence of the certainty
equivalent :
• S1. There exists a certainty equivalent CE : RX → R and for the
constant act 1X we have CE(1X) = 1.
It is rather natural to require monotonicity of the mapping CE:
• S2. If f ≤ g then CE(f) ≤ CE(g).
The main property we impose on CE is linearity:
• S3. CE(f + g) = CE(f) + CE(g) for any f and g ∈ RX .
Presented in such a way, this requirement looks like a very strong condition
indeed. Savage himself and his followers preferred to ”hide” it behind the so-
called ”sure thing principle” so that the linearity is derived from some other
axioms. But as we understand it, this is more of an artifice.
In fact axiom S3 should be understood as a condition of additivity rather
linearity. But together with monotonicity axiom S3 implies true linearity, that
is CE(αf + βg) = αCE(f) + βCE(g) for any α, β ∈ R. As a linear functional
on the vector space RX , CE can be written in a form CE(f) =
∑
x f(x)µ(x).
By axiom S2, µ ≥ 0; by CE(1X) = 1 we have
∑
x µ(x) = 1. Therefore µ(x) can
be interpreted as the “probability” for the realization of state x. Sometimes
this probability is called subjective or personal, because it only expresses the
likelihood that a specific decision-maker assigns to event x. With such an
interpretation, CE(f) becomes the ”expected” utility of the uncertain act f
(or it is better to say - of the act f with uncertain outcome).
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With such a view we may assign probabilities not only to single state x but
also to any subset of states (or to any event) A ⊂ X . µ(A) can be understood
either as the sum
∑
x∈A µ(x), or as CE(1A), where 1A is the characteristic
function of subset A. The interpretation in the second approach is clear: the
act 1A is a bet on event A such that we receive 1 util if event A is realized
and 0 util otherwise (if the opposite or complementary event A occurs). The
decision-maker can compare such bets on events and thereby compare events
with respect to their likelihood. So we arrive at the notion of qualitative
probability measure.
Our main idea is to substitute the Boolean lattice of events with a more
general ortholattice. The move in that direction was initiated long ago, in
fact with the creation of Quantum Mechanics. The Hilbert space entered into
the theory immediately, beginning with von Neumann [12] who proposes the
lattice of projectors in the Hilbert space as a suitable model instead of the
classical (Boolean) logic. Birkhoff and von Neumann in their seminal paper
[2] have investigated the necessary properties of such a non-distributive logic
(modularity, ortho-modularity?). Recently a few decision-theoretical papers
appear (see for example, [5, 9, 6, 8, 7]) in which the standard expected utility
theory was transposed into Hilbert space model. Beside the formal arguments,
a motivation for this research is that a more general description of the world
allows to explain some behavioral anomalies e.g., the Eldsberg paradox (see
[6]).
Lehrer and Shmaya write “We adopt a similar approach and apply it to
the quantum framework... While classical probability is defined over subsets
(events) of a state space, quantum probability is defined over subspaces of a
Hilbert space.” Gyntelberg and Hansen (2004) apply a general event-lattice
theory (with axioms that resemble those of von Neumann and Morgenstern)
to a similar framework. One could expect that Gyntelberg and Hansen truly
would have been working with general ortholattices. But no, they also worked
with subspaces of a Hilbert space. Our first aim is to show that there is no
need for a Hilbert space, the Savage approach can just as well (and even easier)
be developed within the frame of more general ortholattices. Another line of
motivation that we share with other decision theoretical papers in this vein is
that this model maybe a better representation of the subjectively perceived
world. For non-classical features of perception see for instance [1].
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2 Ortholattices
A lattice is an ordered set such that any of its subsets (including the empty
subset) has a greatest lower bound (∨ or sup) and a lowest higher bound (∧
or inf), which guarantees the existence of a maximal element 1 and a minimal
element 01. An ortholattice is a lattice L equipped with an operation of ortho-
complementation ⊥: L → L. This operation is assumed to be involutive
(a⊥⊥ = a), to reverse the order (a ≤ b if and only if b⊥ ≤ a⊥) and to satisfy
the following property a ∨ a⊥ = 1 (or, equivalently, a ∧ a⊥ = 0).
Example 1. Let X be a set and L = 2X the set of all subsets of X. The
order is defined by set-theoretical inclusion. For A ⊂ X, A⊥ = X − A, is the
set-theoretical complement. It is the classical situation.
Example 2. Take some finite dimensional Hilbert space H (over the field
of real or complex numbers). Let L be the lattice of vector subspaces of H
and ⊥ be the usual orthogonal complementation.
This example is standard in Quantum Mechanics as well as in the above
mentioned works. But it was early understood that the lattice L(H) (some-
times it is called the lattice of projectors) is endowed with a number of special
properties. We discuss a significantly more general case in the next example.
Example 3. Let (X,⊥) be an orthospace that is a set X equipped with
an irreflexive and symmetric binary relation (orthogonality) ⊥. For A ⊂ X
A⊥ = {x ∈ X, x ⊥ a for all a ∈ A}.
The sets of the form A⊥ are called orthoclosed subsets or flats. When equipped
with the relation ⊂ and the operation ⊥, flats form an ortholattice F(X,⊥)
(for details see [4]). Moreover almost any (at least any finite) ortholattice has
the form of F(X,⊥) for a suitable orthospace (X,⊥).
In order to get better acquainted with this subject, let us consider a few
concrete examples.
a) Assume that all distinct points of X are pairwise orthogonal. Then any
subset of X is orthoclosed and the ortho-complementation coincides with the
usual set-theoretical complementation. That is we obtain the Boolean model
of Example 1.
1It is more natural to call what we just defined, a complete ortholattice. Usually one
only requires the existence of finite bounds. However we shall not interest us much for the
general case, assuming finiteness of L.
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b) Let X be consist of four points r, l, r′, l′. The orthogonality relation is
represented by the graph below, where we connect points with a plain line
when they are NON-ORTHOGONAL (so that orthogonal points as ”far from
each other” remain unconnected).
❞ ❞ ❞ ❞
r l′ r′ l
The point r is orthoclosed since r = {r′, l}⊥; similarly the point l is or-
thoclosed. There are two other (nontrivial) flats: the set {r′, l} = r⊥ and
{l′, r} = l⊥. The corresponding ortholattice is represented below
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c) Let us consider the orthospace represented by the following graph
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d) On the left side below we depicted another orthospace and on the right
side the corresponding ortholattice.
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We want to defend the thesis that ortholattices is a natural structure for ap-
plying all the concepts that are used in the classical theory of decision-making
under uncertainty. As in the Boolean model we may speak of the intersection
(∧) and union (∨), as well as of the complementation (or as the negation,
and understand it as ortho-complementation). All the usual relations between
these operations are preserved with one exception: the law of distributivity is
not satisfied in the general case. But how often is it used? In the proofs of
some theorems and propositions, perhaps. But hardly in the formulation of
the concepts.
A central point is that it is possible to speak about probabilities which can
be considered as a quantified saturation of the ortholattice skeleton.
3 Non-classical probability
We show here how the basic concepts of classical probability theory carry over
to ortholattices.
The theory of probability starts with the definition of a set X of elementary
events. Thereafter it moves over to general events. In our language events
(or properties) are elements of an ortholattice L. The next key concept is a
”collection of mutually exclusive events”. In the classical model this is simply
a partition of the set X , that is a decomposition X = A1 ∐ ... ∐ An. In the
general case the notion of a collection of mutually exclusive events should be
replaced by the notion of an Orthogonal Decomposition of the Unit.
Definition. An Orthogonal Decomposition of the Unit (ODU) in an ortho-
lattice L is a (finite) family of α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α) ) of elements of L satisfying
the following condition: for any i ∈ I(α)
a(i)⊥ =
∨
j 6=i
a(j).
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The justification for this formulation is provided by that a(i) ⊥ a(j) for
i 6= j and ∨ia(i) = 1. The proof is obvious.
For instance, the single-element family 1 is a (trivial) ODU. For any a ∈ L,
the two-element family (a, a⊥) is an ODU. We call this kind of family the
question about property a.
Intuitively, the family α is to be understood as a measurement (or a source
of information) with a set of possible outcomes I(α). If such a measurement
yields an outcome i ∈ I(α), we conclude that our system is endowed with
property a(i) (or that the event a(i) occurs). Assume that we can ”prepare”
our system in some state and repeatedly measure the system (each time pre-
pared in that same state) with our measurement apparatus. The measurement
outcomes can differ from one trial to another. Imagine that we performed n
such measurements (for n relatively large) and that outcome i was obtained
ni times. Then we can assign each outcome i a ”probability” pi = ni/n. In
fact we have that pi ≥ 0 and
∑
pi = 1. This leads us to
Definition. An evaluation on an ortholattice L is a mapping ν : L → R.
An evaluation ν is called
1) nonnegative if ν(a) ≥ 0 for any a ∈ L;
2) monotone if ν(a) ≤ ν(b) when a ≤ b;
3) normed if ν(1) = 1;
4) additive (or a measure) if ν(a∨ b) = ν(a) + ν(b) for orthogonal events a
and b. We write a⊕ b instead of a ∨ b to emphasize that a ⊥ b.
5) probabilistic (or a probability) if it is nonnegative and
∑
i ν(a(i)) = 1
for any ODU (a(i), i ∈ I).
We make a few simple remarks on links between these concepts. From 4)
or 5) it follows easily that ν(0) = 0; clearly then 2) =⇒ 1). It is also clear
that 5) =⇒ 3), and 1), 3) and 4) together imply 5). In the classical (Boolean)
case 5) implies 1) - 4), but that is not true in the general case. Indeed, let us
consider Example 3b, where (excluding the trivial events 1 and 0) we have
four events r, l, r⊥, l⊥ and where r ≤ l⊥ and l ≤ r⊥. To give a probability
is equivalent to give two numbers ν(r) and ν(l) both between 0 and 1 but
otherwise arbitrary. Such a probability is monotone if ν(r) + ν(l) ≤ 1 and is
additive if ν(r) + ν(l) = 1.
There exists an important case when everything simplifies and approaches
the classical case. It is the case of orthomodular lattices. So are called the
lattices that satisfy the property of orthomodularity (if a ≤ b then b = a ∨
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(b ∧ a⊥)). It is clear that any Boolean lattice is orthomodular and so are the
lattices from Examples 2, 3c, and 3d. In contrast, the lattice from Example
3b is not orthomodular. We assert that for orthomodular lattices, property 5)
implies 3) and 4).
Lemma. If L is orthomodular ortholattice, then any probability on L is
additive and monotonic.
Proof. Let ν be a probability on L. We first establish additivity. Suppose
a ⊥ b and pose c = (a⊕ b)⊥. Since (c, c⊥) is an ODU, ν(c) + ν(c⊥) = 1.
We assert that (a, b, c) is an ODU as well. To prove that we need to show
that a⊥ = b⊕ c. Since a, b and c are pairwise orthogonal, b⊕ c ≤ a⊥. By force
of the property of orthomodularity we have a⊥ = (b⊕ c)⊕ (a⊥ ∧ (b⊕ c)⊥). But
a⊥ ∧ (b⊕ c)⊥ = (a ∨ b ∨ c)⊥ = (a⊕ b)⊥. ∧ c⊥ = c ∧ c⊥ = 0. Hence a⊥ = b⊕ c.
Similarly b⊥ = a⊕ c. The equality c⊥ = a⊕ b is satisfied by definition. Thus,
the triplet (a, b, c) is an ODU.
Therefore we have the equality ν(a) + ν(b) + ν(c) = 1. Hence ν(a ⊕ b) =
ν(c⊥) = 1− ν(c) = ν(a) + ν(b), which yields the additivity of ν.
Monotonicity follows trivially from the formula b = a⊕ (b ∧ a⊥), the addi-
tivity and the nonnegativity of the number ν(b ∧ a⊥). QED
Thus, for the case of orthomodular lattices, a probability may also be
defined as a nonnegative normed measure.
4 Qualitative Measures
As it was already explained above we model uncertainty by an ortholattice of
properties or events. If we understand the elements of the lattice as events, we
may talk of smaller or larger probability for the realization of these events. Fur-
ther we focus on the ”more (or less) likely than” qualitative relation between
events.
Definition. A qualitative measure on an ortholattice L is a binary relation
(of “likelihood”)  on L satisfying the following two axioms:
QM1.  is complete and transitive.
QM2. Let a  b and a′  b′. Then a ⊕ a′  b ⊕ b′ (recall that it means
that a ⊥ a′and b ⊥ b′). The last inequality is strict if at least one of the first
inequalities is strict.2
2The special case of QM2 when a′ = b′ is referred to in [8] as De Finetti axiom.
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A qualitative measure  is generated by a (quantitative) measure µ when
a  b if and only if µ(a) ≤ µ(b). In this section we are interested by the
question as to when a qualitative measure can be generated by a quantitative
measure (or when there exists a probabilistic sophistication). For simplicity we
shall assume that the ortholattice L is finite. But even in the classical context
the answer is generally negative (Kraft, Pratt, Seidenberg, 1959) Therefore in
order to obtain a positive answer we have to impose some additional conditions
which strengthen QM2. We shall here consider a condition generalizing the
classical “cancellation condition”. We prefer to call it “hyperacyclicity”.
Definition. A binary relation on L is said to be hyperacyclic if the follow-
ing condition holds:
Assume that we have a finite collection of pairs (ai, bi) and that ai  bi for
all i and for some i the inequality is strict. Then
∑
µ(ai) 6=
∑
µ(bi) for some
measure µ on L.
It is obvious that hyperacyclicity implies acyclicity as well as .
Clearly, if the qualitative relation  is generated by a measure µ then it is
hyperacyclic. The main result of this section (and the analog of Theorem 1 in
[8]) asserts that for finite ortholattice the reverse is true.
Theorem 1. Let  be a hyperacyclic qualitative measure on a finite or-
tholattice L. Then  is generated by some measure on L.
A complete proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix. Here we
confine ourselves with describing the logic of the proof: We first embed the
ortholattice L into a vector space V and identify linear functionals on V with
measures on L. With the qualitative measure  we construct a subset P ⊂ V
and show that 0 does not belong to the convex hull of P . The separability
theorem then guarantees the existence of a linear functional on V (that is of
a measure on L) which is strictly positive on P . It is easy to show that this
measure generates the relation .
Clearly, if the relation  is monotonic (that is a  b for a ≤ b), then any
measure µ generating  is also monotonic. If, in addition, 0 ≺ 1 then µ(1) > 0;
dividing the measure µ by µ(1) we can assume that µ is a normalized measure.
Thus, the measure µ is a monotonic probability.
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5 Non-classical utility theory
First of all we need to formulate a suitable generalization of the Savagian
concept of act. Roughly speaking an act is a bet on the result of some mea-
surement.
Definition. An act is a pair (α, f), where α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α)) is some
ODU (or a measurement), and f : I(α)→ R is a function.
We call the measurement α the basis of our act. Intuitively, if an outcome
i ∈ I(α) is realized as a result of measurement α, then our agent receives f(i)
utils.
In such a way the set of acts with basis α can be identified with the set
(vector space, indeed) F (α) = RI(α). The set of all acts F is the disjoint union
of F (α) taken over all ODU α.
We are concerned with the comparison of acts with respect to their at-
tractiveness for our decision-maker. We start with a implicit formula for such
a comparison. Assume that the agent knows (more precisely, he thinks he
knows) the state of the system, that is he has in his mind a (subjective) prob-
ability measure µ on the ortholattice L. Then, for any act f on the basis
α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α)), he can compute the following number (expected value of
the act f)
CEµ(f) =
∑
i
µ(a(i))f(i).
Using those numbers our agent can compare different acts.
We now shall (following Savage) go the other way around. We begin with
a relation  representing preferences over the set of all acts F , thereafter we
formulate axioms, impose conditions and arrive at the conclusion that the
preferences are explained by some probability measure µ on L.
More precisely, instead of a preference relation  on the set F of acts, we at
once assume the existence of a certainty equivalent CE(f) for every act f ∈ F .
(Of course that does simplify the task a little. But this step is unrelated to the
issue of classicality or non-classicality of the ”world”; it is only the assertion
of the existence of a utility on the set of acts. It would have been possible to
obtain the existence of CE from yet other axioms. We chose a more direct
and shorter way).
Given that we shall only impose three requirements on CE. The first two
relate to acts defined on a fixed basis. Such acts are identified with elements
of the vector space F (α) = Rα.
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Monotonicity axiom. The restriction of CE on each F (α) is a monotone
functional.
Linearity axiom. For any measurement α the restriction of CE on F (α)
is a linear functional.
The third axiom links acts between different but in some sense comparable
basis. For this we need to be able to compare at least roughly two different
measurements. Consider two ODU α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α)) and β = (b(j), j ∈
I(β)). We say the measurement α is finer than β if there exists a mapping
ϕ : I(α) → I(β) such that a(i) ≤ b(ϕ(i)) for any i ∈ I(α). Simply stated it
means that as we know a result i of the first measurement, we know the result
of the second measurement without performing it, it is j = ϕ(i). We note also
that the transformation mapping ϕ is uniquely defined. In fact assume that
ϕ(i) simultaneously belongs to b(j) and b(k). Then a(i) belongs to b(j)∧ b(k).
But since b(j) and b(k) are orthogonal b(j) ∧ b(k) = 0, so a(i) = 0. But this
type of event do only formally enter the decomposition of the unit and they
can be neglected.
In any case any such mapping ϕ : I(α)→ I(β) defines a mapping
ϕ∗ : F (β)→ F (α).
For a function g on I(β) the function ϕ∗(g) in a point i has the value g(ϕ(i)).
Intuitively, the payoffs from both functions (acts) g and f = ϕ∗(g) are
identical in all situations. Therefore our agent should consider them as equiv-
alent and assign them the same certainty equivalent. This is the idea of the
following axiom.
Agreement axiom. Suppose that a measurement α is finer than β and
ϕ : I(α)→ I(β) is the corresponding mapping. Then CE(g) = CE(ϕ∗(g)) for
each g ∈ F (β).
Take for instance f to be the constant function in I(α) with value 1. The
agreement axiom says that the agent is indifferent between two acts. The first
is to receive one util without performing any measurement. The second is to
perform the measurement α and (independently of the outcome) to receive a
unit of utils.
The last requirement which cannot really be called an axiom says that the
utility of the trivial act with payoff 1 is equal to 1. That is CE(1) = 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose that a certainty equivalent CE satisfies the mono-
tonicity, linearity and agreement axioms. Then there exists a probabilistic
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valuation µ on L such that CE(f) =
∑
i µ(a(i))f(i) for any act f on the basis
of measurement α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α)). Moreover this valuation µ is uniquely
defined.
Proof. For a ∈ L we denote 1a the bet on the property a. It gives 1
util if we receive the answer YES on the question (a, a⊥) and 0 for NO. Let
µ(a) = CE(1a). Since 1a ≥ 0 we have µ(a) ≥ 0 for any a ∈ L.
Let now α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α)) be an arbitrary ODU, and f : I(α) → R be
an act on the basis α. We denote with the symbol 1i the act on the basis of
α which yields 1 on i and 0 on F (α)− {i}. By the agreement axiom we have
that CE(1i) = µ(a(i)). Since f =
∑
i f(i)1i we conclude that
CE(f) =
∑
i
µ(a(i))f(i)
In particular, if f = 1 we obtain that 1 = CE(1) =
∑
i µ(a(i)). Therefore µ is
a probabilistic valuation. QED
We do not assert that the valuation µ is monotone. In the next section we
substitute the agreement axiom with a stronger ”dominance” axiom and we
obtain the monotonicity of µ.
6 The Dominance axiom
Let α = (a(i), i ∈ I(α)) be a measurement (or an ODU). And let b ∈ L be an
event (or a property). We say that an outcome i ∈ I(α) is impossible under
condition b (or in presence of the property b), if a(i) ⊥ b. All other outcomes
are in principle possible, and we denote the set of possible outcomes as I(α|b).
Clearly
b ≤
∨
i∈I(a|b)
a(i) = a(I(α|b)),
and I(α|b) is the smallest subset of I(α) with that property. In fact if b ≤ a(J)
then a(J)⊥ ≤ b⊥. But a(J)⊥ = a(I(α)− J), therefore for any i, not belonging
to J, we have a(i) ≤ b⊥, that is a(i) ⊥ b.
Consider for instance a situation when we have two measurements α =
(a(i), i ∈ I(α)) and β = (b(j), j ∈ I(β)). Suppose that the measurement α is
finer than β and ϕ : I(α)→ I(β) is the corresponding mapping. Since
b(j) = a(ϕ−1(j)),
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it is easily seen that I(α|b(j)) = ϕ−1(j) and I(β|a(i)) = {ϕ(i)}.
We go back to acts. Let f : I(α) → R and g : I(β) → R be acts on
the α and β basis respectively. We say the g dominates f (and write f ≤ g)
if for any i ∈ I(α) and any j ∈ I(β|a(i)) (that is j is possible at the event
a(i)) the inequality f(i) ≤ g(j) is true. Intuitively, this means that the act g
always gives no less than the act f . With such an interpretation it is natural to
assume that our rational decision-maker must assign to g no less utility than
to f. We formulate this as
Axiom of dominance. If f ≤ g then CE(f) ≤ CE(g).
It is clear that the dominance implies monotonicity. We assert that the
dominance axiom also implies the axiom of agreement. In fact let β be a
measurement coarser than α and f = ϕ∗(g) for some act g on the β basis.
From the description above it is clear that f ≤ g and g ≤ f such that CE(f) =
CE(g).
Theorem 3. Assume that the axiom of linearity and dominance are satis-
fied. Then CE is an expected utility for some monotonic probability measure
µ on L.
Proof. The first statement follows from earlier remarks and theorems.
Therefore we should prove the monotonicity of the measure µ. Let a ≤ b. Con-
sider two measurement-questions α = (a, a⊥) and β = (b, b⊥). Let f = 1a, that
is a bet on event (property) a : the agent receives one util if measurement α
reveals (actualizes) property a, and receives nothing in the opposite case. We
define 1b similarly on the β basis. Clearly 1a ≤ 1b. In fact if the first mea-
surement reveals (actualizes) property a, then b is true for sure since a ≤ b.
Therefore 1b gives the agent one utils when a occurs, and ≥ 0 utils when a
⊥
occurs, which is not worth less than 1a. By force of the axiom of dominance
CE(α) ≤ CE(β). The first term is equal to µ(a) and the second to µ(b). QED
Appendix
Here we prove Theorem 1.
1. Construction of the vector space V . Denote R⊗L the vector space
generated by L. It consists of (finite) formal expressions of the form
∑
i riai,
where ri ∈ R and ai ∈ L. Denote K the vector subspace in R⊗L generated
by expressions a ⊕ b − a − b (recall that a ⊕ b means that a ⊕ b = a ∨ b and
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a ⊥ b.) Finally, V = V (L) is the quotient space R⊗L by the subspace K,
V = (R⊗L)/K.
The ortholattice L naturally maps into V ; the image 1 · a of an element
a ∈ L we denote simply as a. Any linear functional l on V restricted to L gives
a valuation on L. Since l(a⊕b−a−b) = l(a⊕b)−l(a)−l(b) = 0, the valuation l is
additive, that is a measure on the ortholattice L. Conversely, let l be a measure
on L. We extend it by linearity to R⊗L assuming l(
∑
riai) =
∑
ril(ai). By
force of additivity, l yields 0 for elements of the form a ⊕ b − a − b, that is l
vanishes on the subspace K. Therefore l factors through V and is obtained
from a linear functional defined on V . We just proved
Proposition 1. The vector space of measures on L is identified with the
space V ∗ of linear functionals on V .
Remark. The canonical mapping L → V (L) can be considered as the
universal measure on the ortholattice L. It is injective if and only if the
ortholattice L is orthomodular.
2. Construction of the set of “strictly positive” P . Let  be a binary
relation on L; as usual, ≺ denote the strict part of . By definition, P = P ()
consists of (finite) expressions of the form
∑
i(ai − bi), where bi  ai for all i
and bi ≺ ai for some i. (P is empty if the relation ≺ is empty, that is if all
elements in L are equivalent relatively to .) We note also that P is stable
with respect to the addition.
3. Suppose now that a relation  is hyperacyclic. Note that the hypera-
cyclicity of  means precisely that 0 does not belongs to P .
Proposition 2. If the relation  is hyperacyclic then 0 does not belong to
the convex hull of P .
Proof. Assume that 0 is a convex combination of elements of P , 0 =
∑
i ripi,
where pi ∈ P , ri ≥ 0, and
∑
i ri = 1. By Caratheodory’s theorem we can
assume that the pi are affinely independent (and therefore the coefficients ri
are uniquely defined). We assert that in this case the coefficients are rational
numbers.
It would be simplest to say that the set P is defined over the field of rational
numbers. But it is not so easy to provide a precise meaning to it. For that
purpose we choose and fix some subset L ⊂ L, such that its image in V is a
basis of that vector space. We also choose a subset M of expressions of the
form a ⊕ b − a − b, which constitute a basis of the subspace K. The union
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of L and M is a basis of the vector space R⊗L. On the other side, L is a
basis of R⊗L as well. Since elements of L ∪M are rational combinations of
elements of the L,basis elements of L, in turn, can be rationally expressed in
terms of L ∪M . In particular, the images of elements of L in V are rational
combinations of elements of the L basis. All the more, the elements pi ∈ P can
be rationally expressed in terms of L. It follows (see, for example, Proposition
6 in [3], Chap. 2, § 6) that 0 can be expressed rationally through pi. Since the
coefficients ri are defined uniquely, they are rational numbers.
Now the proof can be easily completed. We have an equality 0 =
∑
i ripi,
where pi ∈ P and ri are rational numbers (not all equal to zero). Multiplying
with a suitable integer we may consider ri themselves as integers. Since P is
stable with respect to addition, we obtain that 0 ∈ P , in contradiction with
hyperacyclicity of the relation .
4. Together with Separation theorem of convex sets (see [10]) the results
above imply existence of a (non-trivial) linear functional µ on V , non-negative
on P . But we need strict positivity on P . To obtain it we show that (in the
case of a finite ortholattice L) the convex hull of P is a polyhedron.
Let us introduce some notations. A denotes the set of expression a − b,
where a ≻ b. B denotes the set of rays of the form R+(a − b), where a  b.
Finally, Q is the convex hull of A ∪ B in V . By definition, Q consists of
elements of the form
q = α1(a1 − b1) + ...+ αn(an − bn) + β1(c1 − d1) + ...+ βm(cm − dm), (∗)
where ai, bi, cj, dj ∈ L (more precisely, belong to their image in V ), ai ≻ bi for
any i, cj  dj for any j, αi, βi are nonnegative, and
∑
i αi = 1.
Proposition 3. The convex hull of P coincides with Q.
Proof. It is clear from the definitions that any element of P belongs to Q.
By the convexity of Q, the convex hull of P is also contained in Q.
It remains to show the converse, that any element q of Q belongs to the
convex hull of P . For that (appealing to the convexity of co(P )) we can assume
that q has the form in (∗) with n and m equal to 1, that is
q = (a− b) + β(c− d),
where a ≻ b, c  d and β ≥ 0. If β is an integer, it is clear that q ∈ P. In
general case β is a convex combination of two nonnegative integers β1 and β2;
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then q is the corresponding convex combination of two points (a−b)+β1(c−d)
and (a− b) + β2(c− d) both belonging to P .
Corollary. Assume that an ortholattice L is finite. Then the convex hull
of P is a polyhedron.
In fact, in this case the sets A and B are finite. Therefore (see [10], theorem
19.1) Q is a polyhedra.
Thus, if 0 does not belong to the convex hull of P (see Proposition 2) then
there exists a linear functional µ on V which is strictly positive on P . As we
shall see, this immediately provides us with a proof of Theorem 1.
5. Proof of Theorem 1. The assertion in the theorem is trivially true if
all elements of L are equivalent to each other. Therefore we can assume that
there exists at least one pair (a, b) such that a ≻ b. Let µ be a linear functional
on V (we may consider µ as a measure on the ortholattice L) strictly positive
on P . We assert that this measure generates the relation  .
Let us suppose c  d. Since for any integer positive number n the element
(a − b) + n(c − d) belongs to P , we have µ(a) − µ(b) > n (µ(d) − µ(c)) for
any n. This implies µ(d) ≤ µ(c). Conversely, let us suppose µ(c) ≥ µ(d) for
some c, d ∈ L. We have to show that c  d. If this is not the case then, by
completeness of the relation , we have d ≻ c. But then d − c belongs to P
and µ(d − c) = µ(d) − µ(c) > 0, which contradicts to our first assumption.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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